SUMMARY: The twentieth century was "short", running only from 1914 to 1990/ 1991. Even so, it will doubtless enter history as an unprecedented era of dictatorships. The question of how these totalitarian regimes functioned in practice, how and to what extent they were able to realize their power aspirations, has until now been answered empirically at most highly selectively. Extensive comparative research efforts will be required over the coming decades. The police as the key organization in the state monopoly of power is particularly important in this context, since like no other institution it operates at the interface of state and society. Using the example of the Gestapo's activities in the Third Reich, this article analyses collaboration structures between these two spheres, which made possible (either on a voluntary or coercive basis) a penetration of social contexts and hence police action even in shielded areas. It is my thesis that such exchange processes through unsolicited denunciation and informers with double identities will also have been decisive outside Germany in the tracking of dissident behaviour and the detection of conspiratorial practices.
I do not think it is too far-fetched to say that the century which is about to end will go down in history as the era of dictatorships. But a social history of this state-legitimized and -executed terror, let alone an international comparison on a solid empirical basis, is still a long way off. This is true in particular for the institution of the police, the key domestic organization of state power, which like almost no other operates at the interface between state and society and which in its development reflects the changing relationships between the two spheres.
1 At the moment we have only a fragmentary and selective grasp of the exchange processes which occurred at this interface, how societies in dictatorial regimes were
The advantage of this operation was obvious. This demonizing exclusion also shifted the burden of responsibility for what had happened. The more the Gestapo figured as the very incarnation of the dictatorship, the more it was endowed with the gifts of omniscience and omnipresence, and the more detached did the army of accomplices and fellow travellers appear. 6 What took place was a creeping process of social exoneration, in which the Gestapo gradually became the "alibi of the nation", 7 the proof of the claim that the Germans' willingness to follow was above all a result of their fear of persecution. And there arose a sharp antithetical opposition of dictatorship and population, which presented Germany as the "first occupied country", 8 which downplayed the social interaction and cooperation with the regime as well as the state police's structural reliance on collaboration. Historians in turn reproduced this picture into the present in their own way, by generally equating the intention and the outcome of state police activity, refraining from an analysis of practical operations, and often enough seeing the Gestapo through the distorting mirror of omnipotence. The Nazi propaganda claim of a perfectly functioning secret police, which tracked down the regime's opponents with unerring success, 9 was thus taken at face value and perpetuated in historical writing. (Hamburg, 1953) . 7 Thus Gerald Reitlinger, The SS. Alibi of a Nation 1922 (London, 1956 ; in the subtitle to the German edition (Vienna, 1957) this is typically toned down to "Tragedy of a German epoch" [Tragodie einer deutschen Epoche]. g Friedrich Zipfel, "Gestapo und SD in Berlin", Jahrbuchftir die Geschichte Mittel-und Ostdeutschlands, 9/10 (1961), p. 263. 9 "Stapo sees, hears and knows everything" ["Stapo sieht, h8rt und weiB alles"] was, for instance, the title of an article in the Kiel-based Nordische Rundschau of 2 August 1933, which reported on the activities of the then around 25-strong Stapo branch in the Schleswig administrative district. 10 For views that are analytically and empirically still at the level of the Nuremberg trial, see Edward Crankshaw, Gestapo-Instrument of Tyranny (London, 1956) ; Friedrich Zipfel, Gestapo und Sicherheitsdienst (Berlin, 1960); Jacques Delarue, Geschichte der Gestapo (DUsseldorf, 1964) 14 On average a Gestapo officer had to monitor the population of a small town. Given these figures, the comprehensive surveillance and control of society remained no more than a fond totalitarian wish. This was true not only for Germany. On 1 January 1944, as the last surviving report indicates, the National Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) estimated the Gestapo's total strength at 31,374 officers. 15 This was a definite numerical increase on its pre-war strength, but this figure is put into perspective when it is remembered that these officers were dispersed across almost the whole of Europe. So the state police presence in the various occupied territories was even thinner than in Germany itself. In the general-governorate of Poland, for instance, the Gestapo had 1,578 posts in 1940 16 and around 2,000 members of the Gestapo and Kripo were active there at the end of 1942. 17 In France there were around 2,200 German security police officers in December 1943, of whom only a quarter were trained criminal investigators and the remainder were emergency recruits who had just undergone a crash police-training course. 18 That the Gestapo was nevertheless successful (albeit by no means exhaustively so) in tracking down and eliminating opponents can therefore not be put down to its internal structure. Its relative efficiency was not rooted in its own strength but was essentially derived from other resources.
Leaving aside for the moment the contributions of other state institutions and party branches, 19 it was primarily already existing, but also had specially mobilized, collaboration structures, which offset the Gestapo's personnel deficits and gave it access even to sections of society intent on shielding themselves. Two complexes of complicity spring to mind here in particular, which functioned differently but had the same effect: denunciations by members of the public on the one hand, and reports by Gestapo-employed informers on the other. Both opened up private events to the state police and made society (relatively) transparent to the state institutions. While in terms of function both forms of collaboration helped to sustain the regime, they differed diametrically in terms of their penetration efforts, and to some extent also in terms of their intentions and motives. Thus denunciation was essentially the covert recruitment of the state to fulfil social needs; the activity of informers, on the other hand, was the covert recruitment of individuals and social groups with no apparent links to the regime to state-ordered purposes. In essence, society harnessing the state and the state harnessing society crossed here. A conceptual clarification seems required.
Until a few years ago denunciation was virtually a blank page in research terms. 20 But we now have some regional and local samples, which independently offer evidence of the overwhelming importance of unsolicited information provided by members of the public in the detection of specific crimes. Studies of Unterfranken (a region in Bavaria), Saarland, Krefeld and Schleswig-Holstein all show that (i) between 55 and 80 per cent of all charges laid under the "treachery" (Heimtiicke) and "race defile" (Rassenschande) laws and of all charges of prohibited contact with "aliens" (Fremdvolkische) and of "listening to foreign radio stations" relied on private denunciations, and that (ii) this popular collaboration effort did not subside after the tide of the war turned but actually reached 19 Mallmann, Gestapo, Until 1990, the only studies dealing with this issue were Martin Broszat, "Politische Denunziationen in der NS-Zeit. Aus Forschungserfahrungen im Staatsarchiv MUnchen", Archivalische Zeitschrift, 73 (1977), pp. 221-238; Peter HUttenberger, "HeimtUckefalle vor dem Sondergericht MUnchen 1933 -1939 , Bayern in der NS-Zeit, 6 vols (Munich and Vienna, 1981), vol. 4, pp. 435-526 21 This is all the more astonishing because there was no statutory duty to inform the police of alleged criminal acts, and, tellingly, Heydrich's project of a "people's information service" (Volksmeldedienst), including penalties for those who failed to report relevant information, was abandoned in 1939 on the grounds that it might undermine national solidarity. 22 What is more, precisely because the Gestapo was well aware of the private safety-valve function of anonymous denunciations, it consistently inveighed against them publicly.
23 To this extent denunciation was by no means a process managed or controlled from "above", 24 but more a tolerated phenomenon because it improved the organization's detection rate and gave practical foundation to its cherished aura of omnipresence.
The widespread willingness to inform -in 1937 17,168 people were reported for violations against the "treachery" law alone 25 -was thus well out of proportion to the official demand for such denunciations. But this public enthusiasm was doubtless stimulated by the fact that anonymous reports were not immediately dismissed and that new laws and regulations enshrined new threats and thus created incentives, aroused greed, offered foe images and removed barriers. Concretely, for instance, the ideologically propagated and politically practised notion that Jews had no civil rights provided the specific framework for private denunciations in this sphere, while the input from "below" also revealed the conviction that "Jewish property" was little more than a collective fund which people could avail themselves of regardless of legal title. 26 At the same time it also meant that informers never operated under coercion and that alternative courses of action were always open to them. Thus, that caretaker at the University of Munich would not have been penalized in any way if he had said he had not recognized the people who hurled the last "White Rose" leaflets in the Lichthof. 27 And no one would have prosecuted Helene Schwarzel if she had not immediately reported the fugitive Carl Goerdeler when she recognized him in a country inn.
28
Judging from what can be ascertained about the motives of informers, it seems clear that most of them were not primarily guided by ideological considerations, philosophical conviction or political loyalty. Rather, the conclusion presents itself that in most cases private conflicts were raised to a political-administrative level, that social animosity, business competition and personal rifts were given a subsequent political veneer.
29 Symptomatic of this is perhaps the wife of a Frankfurt regional-court associate judge who was jealous of her husband's friendship with two Jewish girls and asked the Gestapo "to evacuate the Jews to the east, so that her husband no longer had the opportunity to meet them". It would seem, then, that one did not have to be a dyed-in-the-wool anti-Semite to become implicated in the Holocaust. For, as the head of the Frankfurt Jewish Section reported, "The two Jewish girls, which were not registered as 'Jews' by either the National Association of Jews or by the Gestapo or by the residents' registration office but only became known to us from a verbal and telephone report, were sent to the east with the next transport".
30
Denunciation was thus invariably an act of public participation in the Nazi regime, a sharing of power from "below", which often enough revealed an explicit will to exclude and destroy. Voluntary denunciations by members of the public could never fully satisfy the needs of the Gestapo, however. For apart from the risks inherent in them -their randomness, unpredictability and often unreliabilitydenunciations had little to offer in terms of realizing the central tasks of a political police. They may have provided the key to detecting dissent in non-public spheres, but almost inevitably they could not expose the crime of "conspiracy to commit high treason". For resistance was typified by growing concealment and conspiracy, characteristics in other words which meant it could not be directly identified in its immediate social sphere. That is why the traditional police detection methods generally failed here, as did the voluntary and unsolicited efforts by members of the public. Usually willing informers only gained a sniff of resistance when (as in the "White Rose" case) it became public, or when (as in the cases of Thalmann, Leuschner and Goerdeler 32 ) its protagonists had their pictures widely circulated on wanted posters. The resultant contributions from the public doubtless helped to locate the not insignificant tip of the illegal iceberg, but the base could not be exposed in this way. This required other methods.
In tracking conspiratorial opposition groups the Gestapo clearly followed the teaching manuals of the Weimar police: "Any crime fighter knows that probably the most difficult thing in criminal-police work is the successful execution of surveillance operations", Bernhard WeiB, Berlin's deputy police commissioner, recognized as early as 1928. 33 Hence it is hardly surprising that the Gestapo used this labour-intensive means of permanent shadowing at best very occasionally in the final stages of specific investigations, and that the failure rate was extremely high. 34 Instead the Gestapo took to heart another Weimar lesson: "Essentially", to quote WeiB again, "any political police that wants to execute its task successfully must use informers and 'grasses'."
35 This recipe -a perfect example of the end justifying the means -was also supposed to provide the key to eliminating the resistance.
Generally speaking (and this applies to all parties as well) these informers were not undercover agents who were sent into the opposition camp in disguise. Almost invariably they were people who were at home in the environment under investigation and had a certain standing in it. Their greatest asset was their intimate knowledge of the specific circum- and practices, the trust which people active in this environment showed them on the basis of their past, or at least their familiarity with their situation. It is probably this enigmatic reality of mass "betrayal" which turned the Gestapo's informers into a strangely neglected phenomenon, although one would have expected researchers to be intrigued by them.
36
As we know, betrayal shames its victims, in that it invariably also puts the betrayed in a bad light and disavows previous social bonds. But, I suspect, it was precisely this which clashed with the morally uplifting dimension that was and is often typical of resistance studies, which could not be reconciled with its inherently legitimizing function in East and West, with the glorification of its subjects. As a result the phenomenon was there studied selectively and even minimized, 37 while, conversely, actual Gestapo research often presupposed the existence of whole armies of informers, without offering any empirical evidence.
38
If we are to examine this collaboration structure at the interface between state and society more closely, we must first differentiate between various opposition groups, time cycles, recruitment lines and motivations. The communists had already been the object of close surveillance during the Weimar years, and the incipient Gestapo took over not only most staff of the Weimar political police and its files and card indexes, but also the informers who had served the Republic. 39 During the regime's consolida- tion phase a second generation of informers was recruited from defectors. Disillusioned in their revolutionary euphoria, these people took the bull by the horns, as it were, keen to atone for their own past and at the same time using it to their advantage. 40 Such reversals of philosophical outlooks were not only the outcome of individual predispositions, more often than not they were coerced in detention. These turncoat illegals, who agreed to become agents or informers to regain or retain their liberty, formed a third group of this type of subversive, whose numbers were steadily replenished until the end of the war. 41 Heinrich Miiller, later head of the Gestapo, had already decided in 1937 that "the fight against communism comes to a standstill when we have no informers"; hence he demanded that "every time a communist is arrested, we should consider whether the person would make an agent or informer".
42
One of the most persistently cultivated myths is that informers were found only in the spectrum of communist resistance activities, while the social democrats are portrayed as upright and honourable people. 43 Integrity had its limits in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well, and the collapse of the Weimar Republic, the lack of vision, financial problems, the strain of exile and of course the pressures in detention ensured that even leading members of the SPD agreed to work for the Gestapo. At least in former SPD strongholds like Berlin and Frankfurt and in the SAPMO, I 2/3/58, 92, 104, 163, 316; HStAD, RW 58/10902, 27851, 34045, 45160, 49351, 55106, 60536; HStAW, 461/32640; StAM, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm, oJ. 950/33, 2258 , 2420 , 2458 Landesarchiv Speyer, H 38/1399 , 1427 SAPMO, I 2/3/82, [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 131, [139] [140] [141] [142] 162, 163, 165, 273, 285 44 This infiltration process probably started in the summer of 1932, after Papen's coup in Prussia, when the SPD was added to the list of enemies of the state to be spied out. 45 And although it only started to bite after Hitler gained power, the party executive as early as August 1933 adjudged the "informer danger" among the emigrant groups "so considerable that it poses a serious threat to all party activities". 46 Between then and June 1936 it published 17 lists, naming a total of 405 supposedly unreliable party members. 47 While in parallel there was also a partial infiltration of exile groups beyond the left-wing parties, 48 the churches were not declared objects of secret police attention until much later. The RSHA did not order the creation of an apparatus along these lines until the autumn of 1941. 49 As the surviving personal files of Catholic informers show, blackmail played a very minor role in recruitment. Instead, the voluntary commitment out of patriotic motives and even out of sympathy for national socialism was dominant, although this applied mostly to clergy. 50 Essentially their reports did little more than assess the mood among the other clergy and churchgoers or pass on pastoral letters and conference minutes, but on occasion the lethal potential of the informer flashed up here as well. Thus in 1944 a Catholic priest in the Aachen diocese was singled out for praise by the Gestapo for "preparing the ground for rounding up a Polish resistance movement in the Reich territory".
51
Shortly before the churches, the army of foreign workers and prisoners of war, which increasingly kept the machines in the arms industry going, was declared a target of infiltration. The Gestapo special squads which combed the Soviet prisoner-of-war camps in 1941 for personnel to be eliminated had also been told to look out for potential informers.
52
Himmler's circular on how to counter the dangers involved in deploying foreign workers even raised the "extension of a counterintelligence service" among them as the Stapo branches' "most important task", since "this is the only way of identifying sources of trouble early and eliminating them before any damage is done". 53 As bait for recruitment scarce "luxuries" were used, especially spirits and cigarettes, which the RSHA supplied specifically for this purpose. Eastern workers were usually fobbed off with bread coupons. Totungsverbrechen 1945 -1966 , 22 vols (Amsterdam, 1969 -1981 ibid., vol. 12, pp. 742-779. 52 Guidelines issued by the RSHA for Sicherheitspolizei and SD commandos stationed in prisoner-of-war camps, 17 July 1941, BAP, R 58/272, f. 68-72; see Alfred Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene in Hitlers Vernichtungskrieg. Berichte und Dokumente 1941 (Heidelberg, 1982 57 and sought to turn it to their ends and extend it. Anyone who committed this institutionalized breach of confidence secured their own survival but also found themselves in an almost schizophrenic dilemma. They remained at home in their accustomed environment, and in its conceptual and behavioural patterns, values and visions; but at the same time they constantly called the existence of all this into question, and thus undermined and destroyed the world from which they came and in which they lived. For the resistance this corrosion of social reliability bore an ever-present element of surprise, in which presumed solidarity suddenly turned and ended in betrayal. Thus every friend could become an enemy, even though that person, if he or she were a coerced informer, did not harbour any feelings of enmity. Through their very existence agents and informers made the illegal underground into an impenetrable maze.
This should not revive the older perception of a secret agent standing at every street corner, however. Let us first consider some figures and ratios. The Stapo branch at Nuremberg-Furth, responsible for the whole of northern Bavaria, an area with a population of around 2.7 million, had only between 80 and 100 informers at its disposal in 1943/1944. 58 The proportions were similar elsewhere. The Frankfurt Gestapo relied on around 100 informers, 59 and the Saarbriicken branch had only 50 in 1939.
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In practice this meant that at least in these three cases the local Gestapo officers outnumbered the informers, in other words they could not cover the ground either. To put it rather pointedly, the use of informers was thus a key structural element in the repertory of Gestapo activities, but in practice it was a rather contingent phenomenon. These kinds of ratios alone are not sufficient especially in this sphere of policing a society. But although they show that informers were not a mass phenomenon, they do not reveal much about their qualitative coverage, about the relationship between informers' relatively small numbers and the potential efficiency with which they were deployed against opposition groups. If their role is assessed in this light, an odd incongruity emerges. On the one hand most resistance groups of whatever hue were cracked through the use of informers, and this generally required only small numbers of people because their familiarity with the situation facilitated the spying.
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But on the other hand there were, at least at certain times, whole regions and social contexts into which no informer penetrated. For instance, during the war the proscribed KPD's extensive reorganization efforts in Thuringia and the Mansfeld region were never infiltrated, 62 and in the regime's early years a number of successful escapes from prisons and concentration camps involving dozens and sometimes hundreds of outside helpers were never uncovered. 63 So informers were a powerful weapon to take out the resistance, but they were anything but a pervasive phenomenon. An example may clarify this discrepancy: in the autumn of 1943 there were 155 slave-labour camps with more than 100 inmates in the Stapo's DUsseldorf region, but the organization had informers in only 107 of them. 64 Thus only 69 per cent of these camps were supervised from the inside. Bearing in mind that by no means all who agreed to work for the Gestapo really functioned as informers, the actual coverage is likely to have been less than 50 per cent.
These forms of collaboration were no invariable cages of obedience. The structures of subordination could well remain purely formal. For although many informers merely wanted to do business with relationships which no longer counted, some of those who were blackmailed with the protective-custody order saw a chance of at least holding on to their freedom. They tried to "outmanoeuvre" 65 the Gestapo and thus to subvert the commitment they had undertaken.
66 They understood their signing up for the regime -with hindsight their actions can be interpreted as suchalmost as a protective shield, which allowed them to associate with their former comrades with impunity and quasi-legally. 67 That this playing for time also carried the risk of "two-shouldered intelligence work" the Gestapo realized full well. 68 Yet it had to concede time and again that there were branches "which have informers on their books who cannot be justified on the basis of the information they provide". 69 And it had to acknowledge in the summer of 1942 that "Judging from the frightening dearth of incoming reports, it seems that some branches barely maintain links with left-leaning circles any more". 70 The concept of the net may be commonly used in this context, but in that case it must be said that it had many holes and gaps. But at the same time the downside of the informers' scope for self-determination should not be forgotten. As long as they were considered reliable, they could make virtually any accusation, which could then condemn the accused person to the concentration camp for ever. They could also, of course, use such fictions deliberately to compensate for the absence of any real information and lost contacts, either to remain in receipt of state police payments or to get rid of those who knew of their role. 71 In this way they gained the power over life and death. What is more, precisely because the Gestapo knew it was treading on thin ice, as it were, this fuelled the fear of a security risk and led to that brutalization which during the final phase of the war culminated in full-blown massacres. 72 As these observations aim to show, the Gestapo was far more than an institution. Rather, it stands as a metaphor for a multifaceted functional mechanism, in which some sections of the public made considerable contributions to the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship. In reality the interface between state and society was not a clear-cut demarcation line, but the site of complex processes of reciprocal penetration and recruitment, a sphere of rampant collaboration structures which documents the reciprocal dependence of power and complicity. The patterns of cooperation described here formed key components of a web which on the one hand exerted state power within social contexts and achieved the penetration of even intimate family spheres and insulated resistance circles, and on the other hand enabled parts of society to use the regime to further their particular interests and strengthen their positions in the shadow of the (supposed) victors. What becomes visible in place of the old conception of the national socialist tyranny is plebiscitary terror, which illustrates that the exercise of power was not a one-way street but an interaction on a rough terrain.
This conclusion is not tantamount to mitigating the Gestapo's guilt. That it was a "criminal organization" is beyond question and is much more easily provable than at the time of the Nuremberg trials. Nor is this conclusion tantamount to universalizing responsibility and blaming everyone, as it were. But it does mean questioning the still widely held view that a dictatorship is defined by omnipotent power and a subjugated society. It points instead to the interdependence between both spheres, to the chemistry between them, and focuses on the contributions, interests and impulses from society and the deficits, dependencies and inducements from the state. But it also implies doubts about the tenability of the paradigm of the controlling or supervising state, and raises the question whether they should not be complemented or perhaps even replaced by the perspective of a "self-surveilling society". 73 Orwellian conditions, permeated with the spectre of a thought police, do not need video cameras or listening devices; surveillance and bugging can be managed perfectly well without high-tech equipment. Those state control techniques for which "1984" has become a metaphor could rely on tried as well as contrived collaboration structures, on contributions from "below", which were mostly voluntary and made for selfish motives, but often also coerced under threat of sanctions. Although the Gestapo doubtless possessed extraordinary powers and potential to threaten, in a comparative perspective it is not -and this is my thesis -a casits sui generis, a phenomenon unique in all its key aspects, but an exaggerated variant of state repression and social penetration.
One can surmise that exchange processes between the state and society as described above occurred and occur between all kinds of individuals and institutions, even outside dictatorial regimes. In occupied France, for 73 
